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“There Must be Some Way Out of Here”: Why the Convention on the
Rights of Persons With Disabilities is Potentially the Best Weapon in the
Fight Against Sanism
Michael L. Perlin*
New York Law School, New York, USA
It is impossible to consider the impact of anti-discrimination law on persons with mental dis-
abilities without a full understanding of how sanism permeates all aspects of the legal system
– judicial opinions, legislation, the role of lawyers, juror decision-making – and the entire
fabric of society. For those unfamiliar with the term, I define “sanism” as an irrational preju-
dice of the same quality and character as other irrational prejudices that cause and are
reflected in prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry,1
that permeates all aspects of mental disability law and affects all participants in the mental
disability law system: litigants, fact finders, counsel, and expert and lay witnesses.2
Notwithstanding over two decades of anti-discrimination laws3 and, in many jurisdictions,
an impressive corpus of constitutional case law and state statutes,4 the attitudes of judges,
jurors and lawyers often reflect the same level of bigotry that defined this area of law half a
century ago.5 The reasons for this are complex and, to a great extent, flow from centuries of
prejudice – often hidden prejudice, often socially acceptable prejudice6 – that has persisted
in spite of prophylactic legislative and judicial reforms, and – at least superficially – an
apparent uptick in public awareness. I have railed multiple times about the “irrational,”
“corrosive”, “malignant” and “ravaging” effects of sanism, but its “pernicious power” still
poisons all of mental disability law.7
The recently-ratified Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is the
most revolutionary international human rights document – ever – that applies to persons
with disabilities. The Disability Convention furthers the human rights approach to disability
and recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in most every aspect of life. It
firmly endorses a social model of disability – a clear and direct repudiation of the medical
model that traditionally was part-and-parcel of mental disability law. It calls for “respect for
inherent dignity” and “non-discrimination.” Subsequent articles declare “freedom from tor-
ture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” “freedom from exploitation,
violence and abuse,” and a right to protection of the “integrity of the person.”
In this paper, I consider the impact that the Convention is likely to have on sanism. First, I
will briefly discuss both our sanist past and our sanist present. Then, I will consider how the
CRPD has the greatest potential for combating sanism, and for changing social attitudes. In
this latter inquiry, I will also draw on the tools of therapeutic jurisprudence. Then, I will offer
some brief and modest conclusions.
Key words: mental disability law; sanism; international human rights law; therapeutic
jurisprudence; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
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Introduction
When I started writing about sanism, the
potential redemptive influence of interna-
tional human rights law was only dimly on
the horizon. Eric Rosenthal and Leonard
Rubenstein had written their groundbreaking
piece,8 International Human Rights Advocacy
Under the “Principles For The Protection Of
Persons With Mental Illness,”9> in 1993, but
it had been barely mentioned in the law jour-
nals.10 When Rosenthal and Rubenstein first
illuminated how the MI Principles11 came
from “an individualistic, libertarian perspec-
tive that emphasizes restrictions on what the
state can do to a person with mental ill-
ness,”12 they inspired lawyers, advocates,
professors and progressive mental health pro-
fessionals to begin thinking seriously about
the intersection between international human
rights law and mental disability law. This led
me to put on a symposium at New York Law
School in 2002 on International Human
Rights Law and the Institutional Treatment of
Persons with Mental Disabilities: The Case
of Hungary.13 This was the first such program
ever put on at any US-based law school.14 In
the years following that conference, develop-
ments moved on with dizzying rapidity.
Disability rights took center stage at the
United Nations, in the most significant histor-
ical development in the recognition of the
human rights of persons with mental disabil-
ities: the drafting and adoption of a binding
international disability rights convention.15 In
late 2001, the United Nations General Assem-
bly established an ad hoc committee “to con-
sider proposals for a comprehensive and
integral international convention to promote
and protect the rights and dignity of persons
with disabilities.”16 This committee drafted a
document over the course of five years and
eight sessions, and the new Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (some-
times “Convention” or “CRPD”)17 was
adopted in December 2006 and opened for
signature in March 2007.18 It entered into
force – thus becoming legally binding on
states parties – on 3 May 2008, 30 days after
the 20th ratification.19 One of the hallmarks
of the process that led to the publication of
the UN Convention was the participation of
persons with disabilities and the clarion cry,
“Nothing about us, without us.”20 This has
led commentators to conclude that the Con-
vention “is regarded as having finally
empowered the ‘world’s largest minority’ to
claim their rights, and to participate in inter-
national and national affairs on an equal basis
with others who have achieved specific treaty
recognition and protection.”21
This Convention is the most revolutionary
international human rights document – ever –
that applies to persons with disabilities.22 The
Disability Convention furthers the human
rights approach to disability and recognizes
the right of people with disabilities to equal-
ity in almost every aspect of life.23 It firmly
endorses a social model of disability – a clear
and direct repudiation of the medical model
that traditionally was part and parcel of men-
tal disability law.24 It furthers the human
rights approach to disability and recognizes
the right of people with disabilities to equal-
ity in most aspects of life: “The Convention
responds to traditional models and situates
disability within a social model framework25
and sketches the full range of human rights
that apply to all human beings, all with a par-
ticular application to the lives of persons with
disabilities.”26 It provides a framework for
insuring that mental health laws “fully recog-
nize the rights of those with mental illness.”27
The CRPD categorically affirms the
social model of disability28 by describing it
as a condition arising from “interaction with
various barriers [that] may hinder their full
and effective participation in society on an
equal basis with others” instead of inherent
limitations,29 reconceptualizes mental health
rights as disability rights,30 and extends exist-
ing human rights to take into account the spe-
cific rights experiences of persons with
disabilities.31 To this end, it calls for “respect
for inherent dignity”32 and “non-discrimi-
nation.”33 Subsequent articles declare
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“freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment,”34
“freedom from exploitation, violence and
abuse,”35 and a right to protection of the
“integrity of the person.”36
My hopes are, of course, that the CRPD
serves as a vehicle that will finally extinguish
the toxic stench of sanism that permeates all
levels of society. In this paper, I will consider
whether the Convention – ratified or not – is
likely to do that. First, I will briefly discuss
both our sanist past and our sanist present.
Then, I will consider how the CRPD has the
greatest potential for combating sanism, and
for changing social attitudes. In this latter
inquiry, I will also draw on the tools of thera-
peutic jurisprudence.37 Then, I will offer
some brief and modest conclusions.
The title of my paper begins with the first
line of Bob Dylan’s brilliant and iconic song,
All Along the Watchtower,38 a song that cap-
tures the “fragility of the human condition”39
and reflects “the storm of history.”40 Glob-
ally, our treatment of persons with mental
disabilities has spoken to the way we have
ignored (and exacerbated) that “fragility”; the
ratification of the United Nations Convention
is part of a major new “storm of history.” As
Dylan reminds us later in the same song, “the
hour is getting late.”41
Our Sanist Past42
Judges are not immune from sanism.
“[E]mbedded in the cultural presuppositions
that engulf us all,”43 judges take deeper ref-
uge in heuristic thinking and flawed, non-
reflective “ordinary common sense,” both of
which continue the myths and stereotypes of
sanism.44 They reflect and project the con-
ventional morality of the community, and
judicial decisions in all areas of civil and
criminal mental disability law continue to
reflect and perpetuate sanist stereotypes.45
Their language too often demonstrates bias
against mentally disabled individuals46 and
contempt for the mental health professions.47
Courts often appear impatient with mentally
disabled litigants, ascribing their problems in
the legal process to weak character or poor
resolve. Thus, a popular sanist myth is that
“[m]entally disabled individuals simply don’t
try hard enough. They give in too easily to
their basest instincts, and do not exercise
appropriate self-restraint.”48 We assume that
“[m]entally ill individuals are presumptively
incompetent to participate in ‘normal’ activi-
ties [and] to make autonomous decisions
about their lives (especially in the area of
medical care).”49
At its base, sanism is irrational. Any inves-
tigation of the roots or sources of mental dis-
ability jurisprudence must factor in society’s
irrational mechanisms that govern our dealings
with mentally disabled individuals.50 The
entire legal system makes assumptions about
persons with mental disabilities – who they
are, how they got that way, what makes them
different, what there is about them that lets us
treat them differently, and whether their condi-
tions are immutable.51 These assumptions
reflect our fears and apprehensions about men-
tal disability, persons with mental disability,
and the possibility that we may become men-
tally disabled.52 The most important question
of all – Why do we feel the way we do about
these people? – is rarely asked.53
I believe that sanism – along with pretex-
tuality54 – has controlled, and continues to
control, modern mental disability law. Just as
importantly (perhaps more importantly), they
continue to exert this control invisibly. This
invisibility means that the most important
aspects of mental disability law – not just the
law “on the books,” but, more importantly,
the law in action and practice – remains hid-
den from the public discussions about mental
disability law.55
Our Sanist Present56
Although we are more aware now of the
impact of sanism than we were 20 years ago
when I began to write about it, it is not at all
clear that the legal system has made the sort
of structural changes needed to combat
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sanism’s power. I will consider here just one
example: the adequacy of counsel in involun-
tary civil commitment cases.57 I am drawing
on an American case, not because of any
sense of American exceptionalism, but
because I think it is the best example in all
the case law from all the law with which I am
familiar.
The Montana case of In re K.G.F.58 is,
“without doubt, the most comprehensive deci-
sion on the scope and meaning of the right to
counsel in this context from any jurisdiction in
the world.”59 K.G.F. was a voluntary patient
at a community hospital in Montana whose
expressed desire to leave the facility prompted
a state petition alleging her need for commit-
ment. Counsel was appointed, and a commit-
ment hearing was scheduled for the next day.
The state’s expert recommended commitment;
patient’s counsel presented the testimony of
the plaintiff herself and a mental health profes-
sional, who recommended that the patient be
kept in the hospital a few days so that a com-
munity-based treatment plan could be
arranged nearer to her home. The court
ordered commitment. K.G.F.’s appeal was
premised, in part, on allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel.60
In a thoughtful and scholarly opinion, the
Montana Supreme Court relied on state statu-
tory and constitutional sources to find that
“the right to counsel . . . provides an individual
subject to an involuntary commitment pro-
ceeding the right to effective assistance of
counsel. In turn, this right affords the individ-
ual with the right to raise the allegation of
ineffective assistance of counsel in challenging
a commitment order.”61 In assessing what
constitutes “effectiveness,” the court – star-
tlingly, to my mind – eschewed the Strickland
v. Washington standard62 (used to assess effec-
tiveness in criminal cases) as insufficiently
protective of the “liberty interests of individu-
als such as K.G.F. who may or may not have
broken any law, but who, upon the expiration
of a 90-day commitment, must indefinitely
bear the badge of inferiority of a once
‘involuntarily committed’ person with a
proven mental disorder.”63 Interestingly, one
of the key reasons why Strickland was seen as
lacking was the court’s conclusion that
“reasonable professional assistance”64 – the
lynchpin of the Strickland decision – “cannot
be presumed in a proceeding that routinely
accepts – and even requires – an unreasonably
low standard of legal assistance and generally
disdains zealous, adversarial confrontation.”65
In assessing the contours of effective
assistance of counsel, the court emphasized
that it was not limiting its inquiry to court-
room performance; even more important was
counsel’s “failure to fully investigate and
comprehend a patient’s circumstances prior
to an involuntary civil commitment hearing
or trial, which may, in turn, lead to critical
decision-making between counsel and client
as to how best to proceed.” Such pre-hearing
matters, the court continued, “clearly involve
effective preparation prior to a hearing or tri-
al.” The court further emphasized the role of
state laws guaranteeing the patient’s “dignity
and personal integrity” and “privacy and dig-
nity” in its decision: “‘[q]uality counsel pro-
vides the most likely way – perhaps the only
likely way’ to ensure the due process protec-
tion of dignity and privacy interests in cases
such as the one at bar.”66
After similarly elaborating on counsel’s
role in the client interview and the need to
ensure that the patient understands the scope
of the right to remain silent, the court con-
cluded by underscoring counsel’s responsibili-
ties “as an advocate and adversary.”67 The
lawyer must “represent the perspective of the
[patient] and . . . serve as a vigorous advocate
for the [patient’s] wishes,” engaging in “all
aspects of advocacy and vigorously argu [ing]
to the best of his or her ability for the ends
desired by the client,” and operating on the
“presumption that a client wishes to not be
involuntarily committed.” Thus, “evidence
that counsel independently advocated or other-
wise acquiesced to an involuntary commit-
ment – in the absence of any evidence of a
voluntary and knowing consent by the patient-
respondent – will establish the presumption
4 M.L. Perlin
that counsel was ineffective.”68 In conclusion,
the court stated:
[I]t is not only counsel for the patient-
respondent, but also courts, that are charged
with the duty of safeguarding the due pro-
cess rights of individuals involved at every
stage of the proceedings, and must therefore
rigorously adhere to the standards expressed
herein, as well as those mandated under
[state statute].69
On one hand, K.G.F. provides an “easily
transferable blueprint for courts that want to
grapple with adequacy of counsel issues”;70
on the other, no other state court has adopted
its reasoning in the decade since it was
decided. In fact, its rationale was specifically
rejected by the Washington Supreme Court in
an opinion that concluded, with no supporting
empirical or other statistical evidence:
We do not share the Montana Supreme
Court’s dim view of the quality of civil
commitment proceedings, or their adversar-
ial nature, in the state of Washington. The
Strickland standard appears to be sufficient
to protect the right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel for a civil commitment
respondent in this state.71
Writing about this issue in a domestic
context, I have noted:
[G]lobally, counsel’s continuing failure here
still appears to be inevitable, given the bar’s
abject disregard of both consumer groups
(made up predominantly of former recipi-
ents, both voluntary and involuntary, of
mental disability services) and individuals
with mental disabilities, many of whom
have written carefully, thoughtfully, and
sensitively about these issues.72
In short, sanism is not an issue that has
gone away. Although, as I have noted
already, it is recognized more and more by
scholars,73 it still remains “under the radar,”
at least for most courts in the United States.
The CRPD
The CRPD in General74
The CRPD is unique because it is the first
legally binding instrument devoted to the com-
prehensive protection of the rights of persons
with disabilities. It not only clarifies that states
should not discriminate against persons with
disabilities, but also sets out explicitly the
many steps that states must take to create an
enabling environment so that persons with dis-
abilities can enjoy authentic equality in soci-
ety. One of the most critical issues in seeking
to bring life to international human rights law
in a mental disability law context is the right
to adequate and dedicated counsel. The CRPD
mandates that “States Parties shall take appro-
priate measures to provide access by persons
with disabilities to the support they may
require in exercising their legal capacity”.75
Elsewhere, the convention commands:
States Parties shall ensure effective access
to justice for persons with disabilities on an
equal basis with others, including through
the provision of procedural and age appro-
priate accommodations, in order to facilitate
their effective role as direct and indirect par-
ticipants, including as witnesses, in all legal
proceedings, including at investigative and
other preliminary stages.76
“The extent to which this Article is hon-
oured in signatory nations will have a major
impact on the extent to which this entire Con-
vention affects persons with mental dis-
abilities.”77 If and only if, there is a
mechanism for the appointment of dedicated
counsel,78 can this dream become a reality.
The ratification of the CRPD is the most
important development – ever – in institu-
tional human rights law for persons with
mental disabilities. The CRPD is detailed,
comprehensive, integrated and the result of a
careful drafting process. It seeks to reverse
the results of centuries of oppressive behavior
and attitudes that have stigmatized persons
with disabilities. Its goal is clear: to promote,
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protect and ensure the full and equal enjoy-
ment of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms of all persons with disabilities, and
to promote respect for their inherent dig-
nity.79 Whether this will actually happen in
practice is still far from a settled matter.80
Issues of Dignity81
When the United Nations embarked upon the
drafting process of the CRPD, it established an
ad hoc committee “to consider proposals for a
comprehensive and integral international con-
vention to promote and protect the rights and
dignity of persons with disabilities.”82 This
was consonant with the perspectives of observ-
ers such as Professor Aaron Dhir: “Degrading
living conditions, coerced ‘treatment,’ scien-
tific experimentation, seclusion, restraints – the
list of violations to the dignity and autonomy
of those diagnosed with mental disabilities is
both long and egregious.”83
As ratified, the Convention calls for
“respect for inherent dignity.”84 It requires
states parties “to adopt immediate, effective
and appropriate measures. . . [t]o raise aware-
ness throughout society, including at the fam-
ily level, regarding persons with disabilities,
and to foster respect for the rights and dignity
of persons with disabilities.”85 The Preamble
characterizes “discrimination against any per-
son on the basis of disability [as] a violation
of the inherent dignity and worth of the
human person.”86 And these provisions are
consistent with the entire Convention’s
“rights-based approach focusing on individ-
ual dignity,”87 placing the responsibility on
the state “to tackle socially created obstacles
in order to ensure full respect for the dignity
and equal rights of all persons.”88 Prof.
Michael Stein puts it well: A “dignitary per-
spective compels societies to acknowledge
that persons with disabilities are valuable
because of their inherent human worth.”89 In
Prof. Cees Maris’s summary: “The Con-
vention’s object is to ensure disabled persons
enjoy all human rights with dignity”90
In his testimony in support of the UN Con-
vention, Eric Rosenthal, the director of Mental
Disability Rights International, shared with
Congress his observations of the treatment of
institutionalized persons with mental disabil-
ities in Central and Eastern European nations:
“[w]hen governments deny their citizens basic
human dignity and autonomy, when they sub-
ject them to extremes of suffering, when they
segregate them from society – we call these
violations of fundamental human rights.”91
Dignity issues self-evidently affect insti-
tutionalization issues as well.92 An intermedi-
ate appellate court United States case – in
holding that a state welfare department regu-
lation requiring certain patients to receive
services in the segregated setting of a nursing
home, rather than in their own homes, vio-
lated the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) – has read the ADA to intend to
ensure that “qualified individuals receive
services in a manner consistent with basic
human dignity rather than a manner which
shunts them aside, hides, and ignores
them.”93 Courts in Canada have similarly
stressed the role of dignitarian values in cases
involving the autonomy of persons with
mental disabilities: “Mentally ill persons are
not to be stigmatized because of the nature of
their illness or disability; nor should they be
treated as persons of lesser status or dignity.
Their right to personal autonomy and self-
determination is no less significant, and is
entitled to no less protection.”94
Again, the extent to which the ratification
of the CRPD actually affects our sorry history
of stigmatization and marginalization will, in
many ways, be the bellwether of the Con-
vention’s actual success.
Therapeutic Jurisprudence95
One of the most important legal theoretical
developments of the past two decades has
been the creation and dynamic growth of
therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ).96 Initially
employed in cases involving individuals with
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mental disabilities, but subsequently
expanded far beyond that narrow area, thera-
peutic jurisprudence presents a new model
for assessing the impact of case law and legis-
lation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic
agent, the law that can have therapeutic or
anti-therapeutic consequences.97 The ultimate
aim of therapeutic jurisprudence is to deter-
mine whether legal rules, procedures, and
lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to
enhance their therapeutic potential while not
subordinating due process principles.98
Therapeutic jurisprudence “asks us to
look at law as it actually impacts people’s
lives”99 and focuses on the law’s influence on
emotional life and psychological well-
being.100 It suggests that “law should value
psychological health, should strive to avoid
imposing anti-therapeutic consequences
whenever possible, and when consistent with
other values served by law should attempt to
bring about healing and wellness.”101 By way
of example, therapeutic jurisprudence “aims
to offer social science evidence that limits the
use of the incompetency label by narrowly
defining its use and minimizing its psycho-
logical and social disadvantage.”102 In recent
years, scholars have considered a vast range
of topics through a TJ lens – including, but
not limited to, all aspects of mental disability
law, domestic relations law, criminal law and
procedure, employment law, gay rights law,
and tort law.103 As Ian Freckelton has noted,
“it is a tool for gaining a new and distinctive
perspective utilizing socio-psychological
insights into the law and its applications.”104
TJ is also part of a growing comprehensive
movement in the law towards establishing
more humane and psychologically optimal
ways of handling legal issues collaboratively,
creatively, and respectfully.105 These alterna-
tive approaches optimize the psychological
well-being of individuals, relationships, and
communities dealing with a legal matter, and
acknowledge concerns beyond strict legal
rights, duties, and obligations. In its aim to
use the law to empower individuals, enhance
rights, and promote well-being, therapeutic
jurisprudence has been described as “a sea-
change in ethical thinking about the role of
law. . . a movement towards a more distinctly
relational approach to the practice of law. . .
which emphasises psychological wellness
over adversarial triumphalism.”106 That is, TJ
supports an ethic of care.107
One of the central principles of therapeu-
tic jurisprudence is a commitment to dignity.
Professor Amy Ronner describes the “three
Vs” (voice, validation and voluntariness),108
arguing:
What “the three Vs” commend is pretty
basic: litigants must have a sense of voice
or a chance to tell their story to a decision
maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal
has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken
seriously the litigant’s story, the litigant
feels a sense of validation. When litigants
emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense
of voice and validation, they are more at
peace with the outcome. Voice and valida-
tion create a sense of voluntary participa-
tion, one in which the litigant experiences
the proceeding as less coercive. Specifi-
cally, the feeling on the part of litigants that
they voluntarily partook in the very process
that engendered the end result or the very
judicial pronunciation that affects their own
lives can initiate healing and bring about
improved behavior in the future. In general,
human beings prosper when they feel that
they are making, or at least participating in,
their own decisions.109
I believe that TJ has the best capacity to
rid the law of sanism and pretextuality. Else-
where, in a book-length treatment of the
insanity defense, I have written:
[W]e must rigorously apply therapeutic
jurisprudence principles to each aspect of
the insanity defense. We need to take what
we learn from therapeutic jurisprudence to
strip away sanist behavior, pretextual rea-
soning and teleological decision making
from the insanity defense process. This
would enable us to confront the pretextual
use of social science data in an open and
meaningful way.110
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I believe that the same principles also
apply to the subject-matter of this paper.
Janet Lord and her colleagues focus on the
significance of “voice accountability” in the
drafting of the CRPD.111 The application of
TJ enhances the likelihood that the “silenced”
voices will be heard.112
Conclusion
The CRPD, at base, is a document that seeks
to eradicate and eviscerate “stigmas and ster-
eotypes,”113 and that emphasizes and upholds
the “social inclusion [and] anti-stigma
agenda.”114 It reflects the view of Canadian
human rights activists that “only positive
state action can combat the deeply entrenched
patterns of disability disadvantage arising
from stigma, devaluation, stereotyping and
exclusion.”115 Its purpose is to “combat com-
bat stereotypes, prejudices and harmful prac-
tices relating to persons with disabilities.”116
It is also a document that demands law
reform at the local and national level all over
the world,117 whether in the United States or
on the tiny island nation of Vanuatu.118
Although much of its framework was inspired
by the principles and concepts in the ADA,119
the CRPD goes far beyond the ADA in its
positive mandates, its focus on stigma and
prejudice, its uncompromising adoption of
the social model, its reporting requirements,
and its identification of the specific steps that
states must take to ensure an environment for
the enjoyment of human rights (awareness
raising, ensuring accessibility, ensuring pro-
tection and safety in situations of risk and
humanitarian emergencies, promoting access
to justice, ensuring personal mobility,
enabling habilitation and rehabilitation, and
collecting statistics and data).120 It also – per-
haps most importantly – makes visible what
has long been “invisible to the world’s politi-
cal, social and economic process.”121
Mary Donnelly was precisely accurate
when she argued that “the goal of [mental dis-
ability] law reform must include delivery on
the right. . . to dignity.”122 I believe that the
CRPD has the capacity to do this, but only if
signatory nations grasp the extent to which
sanism has pervaded all mental disability law
policy and enforcement over the centuries.
This is an important challenge for jurisdic-
tions such as Victoria in Australia, which are
currently embarked upon reform of their
mental health legislation. I believe that the
application of TJ principles will, finally,
allow us to see this and to, I hope, make this
truly the “dawn of a new era.”123
All Along the Watchtower (to end by
returning to my title) is the most played of
Dylan’s songs.124 One popular analysis sug-
gests it reflects what he sees as a “loss of
humanity” and Dylan’s resentment at
“society’s arrogance.”125 We have, since
time immemorial, through the device of san-
ism treated persons with mental disabilities –
especially those institutionalized” with
“arrogance” in way that reveals a “loss of
humanity.” Perhaps, the CRPD will finally,
and redemptively, offer us “a way out of
here.”
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